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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington Post writer David Segal once observed, "[f]or most
Americans the words 'Washington lobbyist' have roughly the same
cachet as, say, 'deadbeat dad."" Both lawmakers and the public
regard lobbying as an unsavory part of the political process. 2 Much of
this perception stems from the vast sums of money spent each year on
lobbying activity. For example, in the first half of 2004 alone,
mortgage funding companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reported
spending over $11 million on lobbying activities, General Electric
spent $8.5 million, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $20.1
million-and these were only three of the 600 groups that spent more
than a quarter of a million dollars in that six-month period.3 The
amount spent just on direct lobbying, where a lobbyist communicates
directly with officials rather than pursuing other persuasive tactics, is
estimated at almost $2 billion a year.4
The belief that lobbying is more about connections and favors
than sound policymaking is also not without support and further
contributes to the lobbying industry's poor reputation. Although the
"legislator-turned-lobbyist" was not viewed favorably thirty years ago,
members of Congress now frequently move into the lobbying arena
when they retire or lose re-election bids. 5 Even little-known members
are able to earn over $300,000 as lobbyists in their first year out of
Congress. 6 Critics claim that the flood of legislators into lobbying
heightens the perception that lobbyists use personal contacts to take
home big paychecks, 7 and that taxpayers pay the price in the end.
These are not the only unsavory aspects of the lobbying
profession in Washington today. Corporations and interest groups
seeking access to government officials at all levels have found an
1. David Segal, Main Street America Has Advocates Aplenty: On the Hill, Lobbyists for All,
WASH. POST, July 10, 1995, at Al.
2. For evidence that this perception has not gone unnoticed by the judiciary and has
existed for a number of years, see Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (noting that "the term 'lobbyist' has become encrusted with invidious connotations").
3. David S. Hilzenrath, Mortgage Giants Are Near Top in Lobby Cost, WASH. POST, Oct.
25, 2004, at El.
4. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Many Lobbyists Work the Hill with Kith and Kin, WASH. POST,
June 14, 2004, at El.
5. Id.
6. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmaker-Turned-Lobbyist a Growing Trend on the Hill, WASH.
POST, June 20, 2004, at Al; see also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Capitol Hill Increasingly a
Steppingstone to K Street, WASH. POST, July 27, 2005.
7. Birnbaum, Capitol Hill Increasingly a Steppingstone, supra note 6. (noting that critics
"abhor the trend" and quoting Larry Noble, director of the Center for Responsive Politics, as
saying that the practice "plays into the public's worst perceptions").
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interesting way to make high-powered lobbyists work even harder for
their money: the contingency fee. Contingency fee lobbying contracts
have become surprisingly common, particularly in situations where
corporations seek government contract work or appropriations for a
particular program that would put money in their pockets.8 Savvy
clients are increasingly deciding that they do not want to pay full price
when they do not get a desired result, and contingency fees force
lobbyists to risk failure or success along with them.
While contingency fee arrangements are not widely reported, 9
the media has uncovered various examples at the state and local
levels. A recent contract dispute in Florida revealed that the city of
Tallahassee's official lobbyists accepted a $50,000 contingency fee, or
"success fee" as they are sometimes called, for securing approval to
build a luxury resort on public land for their entertainment mogul
client. 10 The 2000 presidential election in Florida led to a contingency
fee lobbying controversy when it was revealed that lobbyists in
Broward County received $500,000 to help a Nebraska corporation
procure a multi-million dollar contract to supply the touch screen
voting machines used in the election fiasco. Broward County
Commissioner Ben Graber said that he heard officials discussing their
desire to pass certain measures only to help lobbyist friends who were
in financial trouble and who would directly benefit from the initiatives
because of a contingency fee contract. 12 According to Miami-Dade
County Commissioner Katy Sorenson, the problem with these
contracts is that "[w]henever you have somebody who's going to get a
real jackpot in exchange for winning a vote, the ethics might slide."1 3
State and local laws that prohibit contingency fee lobbying
sometimes result in sanctions for prominent lobbyists who influence
state legislatures and push for government contracts on behalf of their
clients in exchange for a contingency fee.1 4  While the federal
government has regulated these arrangements for lobbyists trying to
8. See infra notes 9-13 and 76-79 and accompanying text for discussions of contingency
fee lobbying at the local and federal levels.
9. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Wright, J.,
concurring) (noting the "clandestine character which some lobbying tends to assume").
10. Tony Doris, The Suspicious Smell of Success, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., July 21, 2003,
available at 7/21/2003 BROWARDDBR 7 (Westlaw).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Md. Ethics Commission Suspends Annapolis Lobbyist, THE DAILY RECORD
(Balt.), July 1, 2003 (reporting that a Maryland lobbyist was suspended from lobbying activities
for ten months for entering into a contingency fee arrangement with a client).
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influence the executive branch in awards for government contracts, 15
lobbyists are still free to receive contingency fees for lobbying
members of Congress. Some members of Congress have tried to
regulate this behavior, but thus far none of the proposed legislation
has passed.
Part II of this Note discusses the legal treatment of
contingency fee lobbying and the current legal restraints on lobbying
activity in the United States. It examines precedent in the federal
courts, both state statutory and common law, federal regulation of
lobbying generally, and proposals in Congress to prohibit contingency
fee lobbying. Part III discusses the potential First Amendment
challenges to a prohibition on contingency fee lobbying, specifically
those based on the right to petition and freedom of speech. It
examines several pertinent First Amendment doctrines, their
application to the regulation of lobbying, and the concept of money as
speech. Part IV analyzes these doctrines and applies them to a
proposed ban on contingency fee lobbying, finding that while the most
serious constitutional threat to such a ban is its potential overbreadth,
it would likely survive scrutiny under current First Amendment
doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Contingent Fee Lobbying Contracts
Although the desirability of contingency fees has long been
debated 16-- the United States is one of the only nations in the world to
allow contingency fees for attorneys-17-contingency fee arrangements
15. 41 U.S.C. § 254 (2005); 10 U.S.C. § 2306(b) (2005).
16. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 30-35, 65-74 (1989) (arguing that attorneys do not
charge contingency fees based on the actual risk involved in bringing the case, thereby charging
unethically high fees where there is, in fact, no "contingency"); Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall
Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 457-58
(1998) (describing arguments of critics of the contingency fee who believe its use spurs meritless
litigation and "overzealous representation" and provides windfalls for attorneys); Allison F.
Aranson, Note, The United States Percentage Contingent Fee System: Ridicule and Reform from
an International Perspective, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 755, 761-73 (1992) (describing the problems of
frivolous litigation, attorneys who wish to achieve recovery in the shortest possible time, and the
possibility for excessive fees associated with contingency fees).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2003) ("(c) A fee may be contingent on the
outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent
fee is prohibited .... A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined ... (d) A lawyer shall not enter into
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between attorneys and their clients in civil litigation are accepted in
the legal community. 18 While contingency fees in the litigation context
are familiar, many are not aware that lobbyists also accept fees
contingent upon the passage of legislation. Despite their prevalence,
courts disfavor such arrangements and have invalidated them on
public policy grounds for years.' 9 The Supreme Court has consistently
criticized contingency fee lobbying contracts ever since it first
examined the issue in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., in
1853.20 In this case, the Court invalidated a contingency fee contract
between a railroad company and a lobbyist who did not reveal that he
was acting on the corporation's behalf while he was lobbying the
Virginia state legislature.21 The Court explained that contingent
compensation tends to encourage lobbyists to act amorally, leading
them to believe that any means of securing legislation for their clients
are proper and possibly even tempting them to bribe officials. 22
In Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, the Court addressed lobbying
at the federal level and found that a contingency fee arrangement for
lobbying the War Department for a supply contract was
unenforceable. 23  Justice Field said that such contracts tend to
"introduce personal solicitation, and personal influence, as elements in
the procurement of contracts; and thus directly lead to inefficiency in
the public service, and to unnecessary expenditures of the public
funds."24 Although the lobbying in the case was directed towards the
executive branch, the opinion in dicta also addressed attempts to
influence the legislative branch, finding no reason to distinguish
between lobbying the executive and the legislative branches when
invalidating these agreements. 25 Discussing the legislative process,
the Court stated:
an arrangement for, charge, or collect... (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a
criminal case.").
18. Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas ofAttorney Contingency Fees, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813,
813 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. 314, 334 (1853) (invalidating a
contingency fee lobbying contract).
It is an undoubted principle of the common law, that it will not lend its aid to enforce
a contract to do an 'act that is illegal; or which is inconsistent with sound morals or
public policy; or which tends to corrupt or contaminate, by improper influences, the
integrity of our social or political institutions.
Id.
20. 57 U.S. 314 (1853).
21. Id. at 336-37.
22. Id. at 335.
23. Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 54 (1864).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 55.
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Whatever tends to divert the attention of legislators from their high duties, to mislead
their judgments, or to substitute other motives for their conduct than the advancement
of the public interests, must necessarily and directly tend to impair the integrity of our
political institutions. Agreements for compensation contingent upon success, suggest
the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The
law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the contract from its inception. 26
In Hazelton v. Sheckels, the Court dealt directly with an
attempt to influence legislative, rather than executive, action when it
considered a land sale contract based in part on the plaintiffs ability
to convince Congress that the land was an appropriate site for a
government hall of records. 27 The terms of the contract stipulated
that the plaintiff was to receive all money above the sum named in the
contract that he was able to convince Congress to appropriate for the
project.28 The Court invalidated the arrangement on public policy
grounds, rejecting the defenses that the parties had good intentions
and that no improper solicitations in fact occurred. 29
The issue of contingency fee contracts for legislative lobbying
came before the District of Columbia Circuit in 1934. In Noonan v.
Gilbert, a lobbyist sued for the balance due on a contingency fee
contract. 30 The contract provided for a $500 payment to the plaintiff
to lobby on the defendant's behalf before the Public Utilities
Commission and congressional committees, with a contingent
payment of another $500 if the defendant's desired fare decrease
passed. 31 The court recognized that lobbying contracts are lawful
when they do not implicate "improper means";32 but it held that
contingency fee contracts for lobbying suggest the use of inappropriate
influence from the moment of their inception, and are void even when
the services actually performed are legitimate.33
Although there are no modern federal cases dealing with
contingency fee lobbying, these cases remain good law and
demonstrate that the federal judiciary disfavors these contracts and is
even willing to strike them down in the absence of legislation
prohibiting them.
26. Id.
27. Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71, 77 (1906).
28. Id. at 78.
29. Id. at 78-79.
30. Noonan v. Gilbert, 68 F.2d 775, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (stating that "[w]here the compensation for procuring legislation is contingent, the
contract is void as against public policy, regardless of whether corrupt practices are resorted to
or contemplated").
1890 [Vol. 58:6:1885
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Bans on contingency fee lobbying contracts are currently on the
books in thirty-two states3 4  and have generally withstood
constitutional challenge in the courts. One of the most common
contentions is that these laws restrict freedom of petition and speech
under the First Amendment. 35 This issue was considered in an
advisory opinion by the Supreme Court of Michigan, which examined
a pending state bill that included a number of campaign finance
provisions, lobbying disclosure regulations, and a ban on contingency
fee lobbying. 36  While recognizing as fundamental the "right of
freedom of speech, of association, the right to consult for the common
good, to instruct representatives, [and] to petition government," the
justices found no constitutional problems with the prohibition on
contingency fee lobbying.37
34. ALA. CODE § 36-25-23(c) (LexisNexis 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1233 (2004);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 86205(f) (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-6-308 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-97(b) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 11.047 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 28-7-3
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-5 (LexisNexis 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6621(b)(6)
(2001); 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 170/8 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); IND. CODE ANN. §2-7-5-5
(LexisNexis 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-267 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 318 (1989);
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 15-713 (LexisNexis 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 3, § 42
(West 1996 & 2005 Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4.421 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
10A.06 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5-8-13 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1492(1) (2004); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 218.942.4 (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13C-21.5 (West Supp.
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 2-11-8 (West 2002); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 1-k (McKinney Supp. 2005);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-47.5(a) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-06 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 101.77 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 171.756(3) (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §7515 (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-12-6 (2004); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 305-022
(Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-301 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-432 (2001); see also
ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-708 (1998) (prohibiting contingency fee lobbying to secure a state
contract); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6903 (2003) (prohibiting contingency fee lobbying for
contracts for professional services with government agencies); FLA. STAT. ANN. §112.3217 (West
2002 & Supp. 2005) (prohibiting lobbying contracts contingent on executive branch action);
MONT. CODE ANN. §5-7-208(5)(v) (2003) (requiring disclosure of contingency fee lobbying
contracts); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-6-111 (2003) (requiring contingency fee lobbying contracts to be
in writing).
35. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 952-53 (Ky. 1995)
(finding that a Kentucky statute banning contingency fee lobbying contracts did not violate
plaintiffs First Amendment rights of petition and association because of the state's "compelling
interest in insuring the proper operation of a democratic government and deterring corruption,
as well as the appearance of corruption. This, we hold, is demonstrative of the most important of
interests and employs means, closely drawn, to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational
freedom."); Fla. League of Profl Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996)
(acknowledging the defendant's argument that the evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence
since the time of Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71 (1906), may indicate that a modern Supreme
Court would strike down a ban on contingency lobbying contracts, but declining to overrule cases
so closely analogous unless they were overruled by the United States Supreme Court).
36. Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227, 242 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Mich. 1976).
37. Id. at 23. The court also suggested that potential "overbreadth" concerns would have to
be addressed in the context of an actual case or controversy. Id. at 24.
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Some state courts are willing to strike down contingency fee
lobbying contracts even when it is unclear that the statutes in effect
cover the behavior at issue. An Illinois court broadly interpreted that
state's ban, finding that it covered contracts made for lobbying a local
city council.38 The court held that although the statute only addressed
lobbying for "legislation," the legislature intended to cover all action to
influence legislation, be it federal, state, or local. 39  In Hialeah
Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., a Florida court even held that
contingency fee arrangements may be invalidated even when no state
statute is in place at all.40 Although the court dismissed the complaint
because the contingency was never met, the opinion expressed the
court's desire that the issue be addressed by Florida officials 41 and
directed that "when the contingent contract is with a public entity and
involves a raid on the public treasury, it should be the duty of a court
at any level to raise the invalidity of the contract on its own motion to
protect the interest of the public."42  Localities have also expressed
concern over contingent fee lobbying and have considered or passed
prohibitions of their own. 43
The Supreme Court of Montana departed from this state trend
disfavoring contingency fee lobbying contracts, as it actually
invalidated a Montana statute prohibiting contingency fee lobbying.44
The court found that the Montana state law at issue was too broad as
it proposed to reach all contingency fee arrangements and did not
distinguish between those that were legitimate and those that were
"improperly motivated."45
We find that section [nine] unduly infringes the rights of those who, while
contemplating neither illegal nor unethical conduct, need or desire to employ a lobbyist
on a contingent fee basis in order to advance their interests before a public official. The
State may not impose so broad a limitation on the right to petition. The objectionable
quality of overbreadth depends upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First
38. See Rome v. Upton, 648 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
39. See id. (citing In re Browning, 179 N.E.2d 14, 19 (Ill. 1961)).
40. Hialeah Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., 599 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
41. Id. at 1325-26.
42. Id. at 1325.
43. Doris, supra note 10 (discussing a Miami-Dade County ordinance that imposes fines,
criminal penalties, and suspensions on offending lobbyists, and a Miami-Dade School Board
proposal to prohibit lobbyists from receiving fees based on attainment of school contracts).
44. Mont. Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981). Montana has since
repealed its contingent fee lobbying prohibition and replaced it with the following language: "No
lobbyist or principal shall engage in or directly or indirectly authorize any unprofessional
conduct." MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-7-302 (2003).
45. Mont. Auto. Ass'n, 632 P.2d at 308.
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Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application.
46
Although the Montana court remains the only court to overturn
a statute prohibiting contingency fee lobbying, several other courts
applying state statutes have expressed concern regarding the
constitutionality of such bans. The Eleventh Circuit in Florida League
of Professional Lobbyists v. Meggs applied Florida state law to find a
contingency fee contract unlawful; however, it acknowledged that in
light of developments in First Amendment law since the early cases
dealing with contingency fee lobbying, the U.S. Supreme Court could
strike down a ban on such activity. 47  The Chief Justice of the
Kentucky Supreme Court dissented in part from a decision upholding
Kentucky's state law, arguing that a ban on contingency fee lobbying
contracts is inappropriate because it "automatically infers unethical
behavior" and cannot be justified by reasonable necessity. 48 These
opinions indicate that although states generally find these bans to be
constitutional, the sentiment favoring the bans is not universal.
B. Brief History of Federal Regulation of Lobbying Activity
Although thus far much of the action regarding contingency fee
lobbying contracts has occurred at the state and local levels, the
federal government has become increasingly active in regulating
lobbying in other respects. In 1946, Congress made its first foray into
the field of lobbying with the passage of the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act.49 The Act required lobbyists to keep detailed records of
the money they received and the amounts they billed and to file
periodic disclosures of these amounts with Congress.50 The Act also
made these reports public and forced all those engaging in lobbying
activity to register as lobbyists.51 In United States v. Harriss, the
Supreme Court held that these disclosure provisions were not
inconsistent with the protections of the First Amendment. 52 Chief
Justice Warren wrote for the majority, finding that the government
had an interest in evaluating the source of pressures placed upon
legislators in order to prevent special interests groups from
46. Id.
47. Fla. League of Prof'1 Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 958 (Ky. 1995) (Stephens,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 301-11, 60 Stat. 812, 839-42
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1994)) (repealed 1995).
50. 2 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (1994) (repealed 1995).
51. Id. §§ 265, 267.
52. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
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overcoming the voice of the public.53 The Court rejected the argument
that the statute would have a chilling effect on speech, stating that
"[t]he hazard of such restraint is too remote to require striking down a
statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of
congressional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national
interest."54  Accordingly, Harriss provides legislatures that wish to
regulate lobbying activities with significant protection from
constitutional challenges.
Although the Court upheld the Act, it read the Act's provisions
narrowly to avoid a constitutional defect on vagueness grounds. 55
Under this reading, the Act only applied to lobbyists who fit the
narrow statutory definition, 56 which included only "individuals," and
included only direct communications with individual members of
Congress. 57 Prior to 1995, the Act was supplemented by various other
statutes that touched on lobbying, such as a statute requiring the
registration of those lobbying on behalf of foreign businesses or
governments 58 and a statute prohibiting the use of appropriated funds
in lobbying. 59 However, the statutory system created by these laws
and the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act were not as effective as
Congress might have hoped. They excluded a great deal of lobbying
activity, despite the fact that in some cases certain lobbyists were
required to register under multiple provisions.6 0 Studies show that
53. Id. at 625.
54. Id. at 626 (also saying that the Court's narrow construction of the Act would protect
against prosecution in many cases and that any chilling effect would be an indirect result of self-
censorship, similar to that which results from libel laws that are considered constitutional).
55. Id. at 618-20.
56. Id. at 623.
(1) the "person" must have solicited, collected, or received contributions; (2) one of the
main purposes of such "person," or one of the main purposes of such contributions,
must have been to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress; (3) the
intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have been through direct
communications with members of Congress.
Id. (quoting § 307 of the Act).
57. Id.
58. Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (2005) ("No person shall act as an
agent of a foreign principal unless he has filed with the Attorney General a true and complete
registration statement ... ").
59. Byrd Amendment, 31 U.S.C. § 1352(a)(1) (2005).
None of the funds appropriated by any Act may be expended by the recipient of a
Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement to pay any person for
influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member
of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of
Congress in connection with any Federal action ....
Id.
60. H.R. REP. No. 104-339(I), at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 644, 1995 WL
683826.
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many professional lobbyists dodged reporting and disclosure
requirements under the Lobbying Act. A 1990 Legal Times study
found that ten high profile lobbying firms in Washington reported low
levels of both lobbying income and expenses. 61 A 1991 study by the
General Accounting Office found that almost 10,000 of the 13,500
individuals and organizations listed in the book "Washington
Representatives" were not registered as lobbyists, despite the fact that
many of them were often in contact with those on Capitol Hill,
attempting to exert influence. 62
Concerned about the growing practice of unregulated lobbying
at the federal level, Congress replaced the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act with the more detailed and far reaching Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 ("LDA"). 63 This Act requires lobbyists to
register with the federal government within forty-five days of making
a "lobbying contact," 64 to provide separate registrations for each of
their clients, and to include all contacts made on behalf of each client
in their disclosures. 65 Lobbyists must give semi-annual estimates of
the income earned from each client 66 and semi-annual reports of
expenses incurred due to lobbying activities. 67 The new Act covers not
just lobbying directed towards members of Congress, but also lobbying
directed at congressional staff and many employees in the executive
branch as well. 68 It covers any communication made to officials
regarding the "formulation, modification, or adoption" of both federal
regulations and statutes, "the administration or execution of a federal
program or policy," and Senate nomination and confirmation
proceedings. 69 Under the new Act, lobbyists who fail to make the
proper disclosures could face fines of up to $50,000.70 These reforms
have not been challenged on constitutional grounds, and thus far
there have been few cases interpreting the LDA's provisions.71
61. Id. at 4 (citing Judy Sarasohn, Survey Finds a Lucrative Cottage Industry, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at S6).
62. Id. at 3 (citing U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LOBBYING: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT OF 1946 IS INEFFECTIVE (1991)).
63. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (2005).
64. Id. § 1603(a)(1).
65. Id. § 1603(c).
66. Id. § 1604(b)(3).
67. Id. § 1604(b)(4).
68. Id. § 1602(3)-(4).
69. Id. § 1602(8)(A).
70. Id. § 1606.
71. See Kathryn L. Plemmons, "Lobbying Activities" and Presidential Pardons: Will
Legislators' Efforts to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurisprudence?, 18 BYU
J. PUB. L. 131, 144, 147 (2003) (trying to predict the judicial outlook for amendments that would
impose reporting requirements for individuals lobbying for presidential pardons and require
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C. Recent Debate Regarding a Federal Ban on Contingency Fee
Lobbying Contracts
Congress has already banned contingency fee lobbying
contracts when the lobbying is directed at the executive branch for the
purpose of procuring government contracts. 72  Recognizing that
contingency fee lobbying directed at Congress continues unregulated,
there has been a push in recent years to enact a law prohibiting these
arrangements as well. 73 Under the language of one recently proposed
bill, it would be unlawful
for any person to make, with intent to influence, any oral or written communication on
behalf of any other person other than the United States to any department, agency,
court, House of Congress, or commission of the United States, for compensation if such
compensation has knowingly been made dependent - 'A) upon any action of Congress,
including but not limited to actions of either the House of Representatives or the Senate,
or any committee or member thereof, or the passage or defeat of any proposed
legislation; (B) upon the securing of an award, or upon the denial of an award, of a
contract or grant by establishment of the Federal Government; or (C) upon the securing,
disclosure of presidential library contributions, referring to judicial interpretation of the LDA as
"surprisingly scarce," and predicting that if attacked on constitutional grounds the LDA as
enacted would be upheld).
72. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(b) (2000).
Each contract awarded under this chapter after using procedures other than sealed-
bid procedures shall contain a warranty, determined to be suitable by the head of the
agency, that the contractor has employed or retained no person or selling agency to
solicit or obtain the contract under an understanding or agreement for a...
contingent fee .... If a contractor breaks such a warranty the United States may
annul the contract without liability or may deduct the ... contingent fee from the
contract price or consideration.
Id.
Every contract awarded after using procedures other than sealed-bid procedures shall
contain a suitable warranty, as determined by the agency head, by the contractor that
no person or selling agency has been employed or retained to solicit or secure such
contract upon an agreement or understanding for a ... contingent fee ... for the
breach or violation of which warranty the Government shall have the right to annul
such contract without liability or in its discretion to deduct from the contract price or
consideration the full amount of such . . . contingent fee.
41 U.S.C. § 254 (2000); see also Bradley v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 159 F.2d 39,
40 (2d Cir. 1947) (invalidating a contingency fee arrangement that involved lobbying the Army
for a contract to supply weapons components based on executive order requiring those awarded
government contracts to guarantee that they did not hire lobbyists on a contingency fee basis to
secure the contract); Eglin Manor, Inc. v. United States, 279 F.2d 268, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (holding
that award of stock in contractor's corporation contingent upon its certification as a sponsor of a
military housing project was an illegal contingent fee in violation of a federal statute).
73. For proposals "[t]o amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit any person who is
being compensated for lobbying the Federal Government from being paid on a contingency fee
basis," see S. 53, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 44, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 170, 102d Cong. (1991); 136
CONG. REC. S12055, S12063-66 (1990) (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Thurmond);
134 CONG. REC. S11639, S11639-40 (1988) (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
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or upon the denial, of any Federal financial assistance or any other Federal contract or
grant.'
7 4
This bill gave the Attorney General the authority to bring a civil
action against violators for damages up to double the amount due
under the contract, and provided for criminal sanctions of up to
$50,000 in fines or two years imprisonment. 75
Members of Congress found evidence that lobbyists currently
approach institutions that desire federal funding and offer to seek
more money than the institution requires on the condition that the
institution pay the lobbyist from the leftover amount (or not at all
should the measure fail).7 6 For example, testimony regarding the
passage of the Equitable Escheatment Act of 1993 indicated that
attorneys in a large Washington law firm had lobbied aggressively
against the bill in order to collect a contingency award, speculated to
be nearly $16 million.7 7 Rep. Charles Schumer responded to this
situation, calling it "outrageous... chilling and undemocratic," a
"bottom-feeding practice," and a "gun-for-hire mentality" that allows
lawyers to "successfully twist the legislative process.178  While
acknowledging the important role played by paid lobbyists in
educating government officials, the late Sen. Strom Thurmond said,
the law has long recognized that contingency fees are appropriate in some areas and not
in others .... [C]ontingency fees in tort actions provide the poor with access to the courts
and are viewed favorably. In other areas such as criminal and domestic law, such fees
are inappropriate because they introduce improper incentives into the system. Similar
principles apply to contingency fees for lobbying.
7 9
Legislators in favor of proposals prohibiting contingency fee
lobbying contracts argue that they protect the integrity of the process
whereby the government appropriates funds. This is particularly
74. S. 53 104th Cong. (1995).
75. Id.
76. 136 CONG. REC. S12055 (1990) (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Levin) ("We
saw it in the Wedtech deal where a lobbyist was going to receive a $200,000 payment if he
obtained a Navy contract of one type, and a fee twice that amount if he obtained a different kind
of a Navy contract."); 134 CONG. REC. S11639 (1988) (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) (describing reports he had heard of lobbyists offering to secure $14 million for a $12
million project and be paid the extra $2 million).
77. The Equitable Escheatment Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 2443 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance of the H. Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 12 (1994) (testimony of Rep. Charles E.
Schumer, Member, Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Deposit
Insurance).
78. Id. Rep. Schumer also testified: "You can be absolutely certain I will attach my
Retroactive Lobbying Contingency bill as an amendment to HR 2443. Whatever happens to this
ill-conceived escheatment bill ... your law firm is not going to get a contingency out of Congress."
Id.
79. 134 CONG. REC. S11640 (1998) (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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important in an era of massive budget deficits because it eliminates
incentives for lobbyists to "gouge the government" in order to earn
higher fees.8 0  Opponents claim that contingency fee lobbying
contracts create at least an appearance of corruption, regardless of
whether corruption is actually present, and that the costs of these fees
are borne by taxpayers.81 They distinguish such arrangements, made
by clients who can typically afford to pay lobbyists in advance, from
contingency fees paid by parties to civil suits who might not otherwise
be able to afford quality representation.8 2
Some claim, however, that there is no reason to distinguish
between contingency fees for lobbying and contingency fees in tort
cases. Some lawyers argue that lobbyists may be more entitled to
higher fees for lobbying success than attorneys are for victories in civil
litigation because the economic benefits of such lobbying successes can
be quite high for clients.8 3 They contend that if contingency fees are
not considered corrupting in the area of personal injury cases, there is
no reason they should be seen as such in lobbying.8 4 Supporters of
these proposals note that while lobbyist-lawyers are bound to some
degree by rules of professional conduct that prohibit excessive fees,
lobbyists, who are not lawyers, are not subject to such ethical
constraints.85
Arguments over a ban on contingency fee lobbying focus not
just on the merits of such a ban, but also on the ban's
constitutionality. Some legislators have expressed concerns that such
a prohibition would inhibit private parties' freedom to contract,8 6
while others counter that because the arrangement involves a payout
using government funds, it is not analogous to a private contract.8 7 A
study by the Congressional Research Service examined whether or not
a prohibition on contingency fee lobbying would inhibit freedom of
contract or result in an unconstitutional taking of property (in the
80. 136 CONG. REC. S12065 (1990) (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
81. Doris, supra note 10.
82. See supra note 80 (statement of Sen. Specter) ("The substance of the amendment.., is
fundamentally different from a contingent fee arrangement for a lawyer because that contract is
entered into where the client can't afford to pay a fee and can secure a lawyer only if the lawyer
gets a share of the recovery.").
83. Doris, supra note 10 (discussion of the effects that lobbying outcomes can have on things
such as the client's property value by attorney who heads a Miami law firm's government law
practice).
84. Id. at 4-5.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 80 (statement of Sen. McClure).
87. Id. (statement of Sen. Levin).
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form of income).88 The study made strong arguments that a ban
would inhibit neither freedom of contract nor property rights.8 9 This
study, however, did not resolve any First Amendment questions.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE RIGHT TO
PETITION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
One of the most compelling questions raised by a prohibition on
contingency fee lobbying contracts is whether such a measure would
place an unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment rights of
petition and speech. 90 The early Supreme Court cases invalidating
contingency fee lobbying contracts 9' create a presumption that these
contracts are against public policy and unlawful. Thus, if the
judiciary may strike down such contracts on public policy grounds,
then it seems reasonable that Congress may make such arrangements
unlawful based on similar considerations. Nearly a century has
passed, however, since the Court last considered this issue, 92 and the
Court has never considered First Amendment burdens resulting from
restrictions on these contracts. The fact that members of Congress, 93
judges applying similar state laws, 94 and judges looking at other
limitations on lobbying 95 have all raised First Amendment concerns
88. See supra note 79, at 11640, 11640-41. The study noted that challenges to provisions
regarding rates, prices, and fees have generally been upheld in spite of due process concerns
regarding unconstitutional takings of property. It also discussed how freedom of contract is a
limited freedom that is rarely successful as a means of invalidating government restrictions.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 80 (statement of Sen. McClure) ("I am not certain at all that it is
constitutional for us to restrict the way in which people contract between themselves with
respect to the way they exercise their right either to approach [g]overnment or in the freedom of
speech between themselves or between themselves and their [g]overnment."); see also Stacie L.
Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protecting the Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency
Fee Prohibition Violates the Constitution, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559. 559-61, 584-87 (1998)
(arguing that a prohibition on contingency fee lobbying contracts would be excessive and would
impinge on the right to petition).
91. Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71, 79 (1906); Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45,
56 (1864).
92. For a case asking whether time and legal developments may warrant a re-examination
of an earlier holding, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 855-57 (1992) (saying that when the Court re-examines a prior holding, one consideration is
"whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than
a remnant of abandoned doctrine," and finding that no "evolution of legal principles" existed to
justify overturning Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
93. See supra note 80 (statement of Sen. McClure) ("I am not certain at all that it is
constitutional for us to restrict ... their right either to approach [g]overnment or in the freedom
of speech between themselves [lobbyists and clients] or between themselves and their
[g]overnment.").
94. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37, 44-48.
95. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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suggests that a First Amendment challenge to such a prohibition is
plausible. Therefore, any potential challenges must be analyzed in
light of modern First Amendment jurisprudence to determine whether
a prohibition would hold up under constitutional scrutiny. 96
A. Right to Petition
Since lobbyists are in many cases directly petitioning the
government in support of or in opposition to policy decisions, the right
of petition seems most directly implicated by lobbying restrictions.
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the right of the people "to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. '97 Early congressional debates show that James
Madison, in proposing the Petition Clause, hoped to protect people
who '"may communicate their will' through direct petitions to the
legislature and government officials."9 The Supreme Court has
declared that "[t]he very idea of government, republican in form,
implies a right on the part of its citizens to ... petition for a redress of
grievances." 99  This right "is not limited to goals that are deemed
worthy, and the citizen's right to speak freely is not limited to fair
comments."100
Because the right to petition holds a special position in
American jurisprudence,101 courts are reluctant to find that an act of
Congress infringes this right and will attempt to construe a statute
consistently with the right to petition. 102 While in some cases, the
Petition Clause may actually immunize individuals petitioning the
96. See Fla. League of Profil Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir. 1996)
(acknowledging that developments in First Amendment law since Norris and Hazelton may
indicate that the modern Supreme Court would strike down a ban on contingency fee lobbying
contracts but declining to overrule this precedent).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (noting that
the idea of a right to petition predates the Constitution, appearing in the Bill of Rights enacted
by William and Mary of England in 1689 and the Declaration of Rights and Grievances drafted
by the colonial Stamp Act Congress of 1765).
98. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 482.
99. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
100. Eaton v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that
comments made in lobbying a school board calling for the dismissal of a school principal were
protected by the right to petition).
101. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Ky., 912 S.W.2d 947, 952 (1995) ("Assuredly, freedom of
speech, being closely related to freedom of association and the right to petition the government,
remains the highest of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.").
102. See Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961) (finding that railroads did not violate the Sherman Act by launching a publicity campaign
that involved lobbying against a measure that would have increased business for the trucking
industry).
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government from liability they might otherwise incur as a result of
such speech, 103 a defendant may not defend his own criminal activity
by later claiming the protection of the Petition Clause when he lobbies
to change the law that he has violated.10 4
In contrast to other First Amendment rights, there has not
been much judicial analysis devoted to the right to petition.
Nonetheless, courts have determined on a number of occasions that
despite being an essential right, the right to petition is a limited one.
The Petition Clause provides no absolute right to speak in person with
public officials, no right to a hearing based on grievances
communicated to officials, and imposes no corresponding duty on
officials to act on such grievances. 10 5 Protection of the right to petition
only extends to situations where other First Amendment rights, such
as speech or association, are also implicated. 106 Statements made in
petitioning the government do not enjoy greater protection than other
expression protected by the First Amendment.107
Cases discussing the right to petition as it relates to lobbying
activity demonstrate that subject to some limitations, lobbying falls
easily within the category of activity protected by the Petition
Clause.108 In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, the Court of Appeals for
103. Sims v. Tinney, 482 F. Supp. 794, 800 (D.S.C. 1977) (holding that since defendant's
statements were part of a campaign favoring proposed legislation, they were protected by the
First Amendment and immune from an action under the Sherman Act).
104. United States v. Conley, 859 F. Supp. 909, 938 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting defendant's
defense to a charge of illegally operating video poker machines that he was engaged in lobbying
to try and change the definition of gambling devices, saying that "First Amendment rights are
not a means of immunizing oneself from prosecution. Convictions would be few indeed if during
or after a course of crime a defendant could absolve himself by expressing his view that his
conduct should be legal.").
105. Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 895 F. Supp. 375, 390 (D. Mass. 1995).
106. See, e.g., WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999).
The protections afforded by the Petition Clause have been limited by the Supreme
Court to situations where an individual's associational or speech interests are also
implicated. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1985) (describing the right
to petition as "cut from the same cloth" as other expressive rights embodied in the
First Amendment and holding that a petition clause claim must implicate some [F]irst
[A]mendment right).
Id.
107. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485 (determining that statements made in petitioning the
government do not enjoy absolute privilege in determining immunity from libel actions).
108. See, e.g., Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D. Conn. 1973) (saying that the fact
that a lobbyist earns his living exercising his First Amendment rights does not change the fact
that these rights are protected by it; nor does the fact that a client hires someone to exercise
those rights change the nature of the client's protection under the First Amendment); Fritz v.
Gorton, 517 P.2d 911, 929 (Wash. 1974) (upholding Washington's lobbying disclosure laws). The
Fritz court also made clear that the
right to petition, of course, is not limited to mass demonstrations, highly publicized in
newspaper headlines and in television news reports. In sharp contrast, lobbying can
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the D.C. Circuit found that individuals and groups trying to effect
congressional action by engaging in lobbying activities were exercising
their right to petition. 109 Courts recognize that there are a number of
skills that are essential in the modern political process for the
effective exercise of the right to petition through lobbying. These
skills include an understanding of the subject matter, the details of
the legislative process, the players in the process and their
personalities, and the role of the media and third parties. 10 However,
since the right to petition in general is limited, judges are reluctant to
allow lobbyists to invoke the Petition Clause whenever their activities
are restrained. In his Liberty Lobby concurrence, Judge Wright
counseled such caution:
Lobbying often strikes at the roots of the democratic process. Though protected by the
First Amendment's right to petition clause, lobbying is not always in the public interest.
Indeed the special interest, represented by the lobbyist as he tries to influence elected
representatives of the people, and the public interest may be, and often are, in direct
conflict ... [lI]t is really too late in the day to suggest that a lobbyist operates other than
in a goldfish bowl as far as the law is concerned.1 1 1
Seventeen years prior to Liberty Lobby, the D.C. Circuit found
that the registration requirements for lobbyists under the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act did not abridge a lobbyist's right to
petition because it left him "free to exercise those rights, calling upon
him only to say for whom he is speaking, who pays him, how much,
and the scope in general of his activity with regard to legislation."112
In Harriss, the Supreme Court supported this view when it upheld the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act '1 3 despite several dissents, such as
that of Justice Jackson who felt that the Act did not fully protect the
be a far more subtle, unpublicized, and we surmise a more effective method of
petitioning the government. The profound effect that lobbying may have upon the
legislative processes is tacitly recognized in common references to lobbyist activities
as the "third house" or the "fifth estate." We take special and emphatic notice of the
fact that lobbyists perform important and constructive functions in communicating
the wishes of the interests they represent to the appropriate organs of government. In
our opinion, the role of the lobbyist in openly and appropriately communicating with
government in regard to legislation and other related functions of government is
clearly assured and protected by the First Amendment right to petition government.
Id.
109. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
110. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 48 (Vt. 1995).
111. Liberty Lobby, 390 F.2d at 492 (Wright, J., concurring) (saying that freedom of the press
must also be ensured while the right to petition is being exercised, since lobbying activity often
occurs in private).
112. United States v. Slaughter, 89 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D.D.C. 1950).
113. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (holding that registration and
disclosure requirements of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, narrowly construed, did not
violate the right to petition).
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speech directed at lawmakers. 114 In Justice Jackson's Harriss dissent,
he recognized the difficulty in regulating lobbying without violating
the right to petition and criticized the vague standard that the courts
had thus far announced on the issue. According to Jackson, "to reach
the real evils of lobbying without cutting into the constitutional right
of petition is a difficult and delicate task for which the Court's action
today gives little guidance."1 15
Courts applying state laws have also found that restrictions on
lobbyists do not violate the Petition Clause. In 1999, the Fourth
Circuit upheld a North Carolina law that prohibited lobbyists from
making political contributions while the state legislature was in
session. 1 6 In this case, the court rejected the argument that the law
impeded the lobbyists' right to petition, finding the burden on
lobbyists minimal next to the state's interest in preventing corruption
and maintaining public confidence in the legislative process.11 7
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that reporting
and disclosure requirements did not violate the right to petition under
the federal or state constitution. 18
Courts have not given the government unrestricted power to
regulate lobbyists, however, and a state must still be able to justify
restrictions on lobbying. A court examining a Connecticut law, for
example, found that while in theory the imposition of a registration
fee for lobbyists did not violate the Petition Clause, Connecticut's fee
of $35 was unconstitutional because it exceeded the administrative
costs of filing and distributing information.11 9 In Citizens Energy
Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Sendak, a court addressing an Indiana
114. See id. at 636 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 635 (1954) (Jackson, J. dissenting) (stating his belief that the Federal Regulation
of Lobbying Act was unconstitutional). Justice Jackson went on to say:
If this right [to petition] is to have an interpretation consistent with that given to
other First Amendment rights, it confers large immunity upon activities of persons,
organizations, groups and classes to obtain what they think is due them from the
government. Of course, their conflicting claims and propaganda are confusing,
annoying and at times, no doubt, deceiving and corrupting. But we may not forget
that our constitutional system is to allow the greatest freedom of access to Congress,
so that the people may press for their selfish interests, with Congress acting as arbiter
of their demands and conflicts.
Id.
116. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 717-18 (4th Cir. 1999).
117. Id.
118. Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Ky. 1995); see also
Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228, 232 (D. Conn. 1973) (upholding Connecticut's reporting and
disclosure requirements for lobbyists).
119. Moffett, 360 F. Supp. at 232 (holding that although the state constitutionally may
charge a "nominal sum" to cover the costs of administering a regulation, to the extent that that
fee exceeds such a sum it is an unconstitutional tax on the exercise of First Amendment rights).
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lobbying regulation held that "[s]ubstantial infringements of the right
to lobby must be justified by a compelling state interest, and said
interest must be effectuated in that manner which least restricts
lobbying." 120
This type of balancing test, which looks at the government
interests involved and the manner in which the regulation achieves
those interests, mirrors the Supreme Court's free speech analysis.121
Since a lobbyist's right to petition is only protected to the extent that
his activities implicate free speech rights, it is not surprising that
freedom of speech and petition are closely related. 22 The right to
petition and freedom of speech are separate guarantees but are
subject to the same constitutional analysis. 123 Consequently, a ban on
contingency fee lobbying contracts should be evaluated with both the
right to petition and freedom of speech in mind. The following
discussion examines cases involving freedom of speech doctrines.
B. Free Speech
Although some forms of speech enjoy less than full First
Amendment protection,1 24 the First Amendment is "at its zenith"
when "core political speech" is involved.1 25 Expression regarding
issues of public concern is at the core of the First Amendment,
120. Citizens Energy Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. Sendak, 459 F. Supp. 248, 258 (S.D. Ind. 1978)
(finding that a policy of refusing to grant contracts or subgrants to groups that lobby or employ
lobbyists was not related to the government's interest in ensuring efficient lawmaking, and
suggesting that even if it was, the interest was not sufficient to justify the corresponding
infringement of the right to petition).
121. See infra Part III.B.
122. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring)
('The Framers envisioned the rights of speech, press, assembly, and petitioning as interrelated
components of the public's exercise of its sovereign authority .... [W]e have recurrently treated
the right to petition similarly to, and frequently as overlapping with, the First Amendment's
other guarantees of free expression."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("It was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single
guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of
grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.").
123. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 n.11 (1985) (treating the plaintiffs claims of
violations of the right to petition and right to free speech the same, since they are typically
subject to the same analysis).
124. See, e.g. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-
70 (1976) (commercial speech not entitled to the fullest First Amendment protection); N.Y. Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964) (defamation unprotected); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973) (obscenity unprotected); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (speech that
amounts to incitement to lawless action unprotected).
125. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1999), citing
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
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reflecting a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open ... ,"126 However, restrictions on political speech are not treated
equally. When the government regulates non-speech behavior and
interferes with speech only incidentally, courts apply intermediate
scrutiny. When the government regulation directly regulates speech,
courts will apply strict scrutiny.
1. Strict Scrutiny vs. Intermediate Scrutiny
Courts invoke the most exacting level of scrutiny when
regulations "suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens
upon speech because of its content" or "compel [individuals] to utter or
distribute speech bearing a particular message." 127  According to
Professor John Hart Ely, this government objective of suppressing
content serves a "switching" function, so that if the government
attempts to regulate a particular message the court will move into a
more demanding "track" for analysis. 128 In determining whether a
regulation is content-neutral, courts will examine whether the
government was motivated by disagreement with the message that
the speech conveys. 129  If the regulation is content-based, strict
scrutiny applies. To survive strict scrutiny, the regulation must be
necessary to serve a compelling government interest and narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.130
Regulations that are unrelated to the content of the message are
typically subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny based on the
belief that such regulations are less likely to remove particular
126. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
14 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral
to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression .... ). The Court in
Buckley also likened the level of protection afforded to speech advocating candidates for office
with that involving the passage of legislation, lending support to the idea that the case may be
particularly instructive in determining how lobbying regulations may be analyzed by the courts.
Id. at 48.
127. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). In Turner, the Court held
that rules requiring cable operators to carry local commercial and public broadcast stations on
their systems are content-neutral. Id. at 655.
128. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975).
129. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
130. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
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viewpoints or ideas from public discourse. 13 1 In United States v.
O'Brien, the Supreme Court articulated a balancing test whereby the
government may regulate non-speech conduct in ways that
incidentally curtail free speech if it can demonstrate (1) that it makes
no distinctions based on the content of the speech; (2) that the
regulation serves an important or substantial government interest
that is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) that the
incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential to further
that interest. 132 So, under intermediate scrutiny the government
interest need not be as weighty, and narrow tailoring analysis need
not be as rigid. 133 In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
the Court likened the O'Brien test to the test for "time, place, and
manner" restrictions-i.e., restrictions that only regulate the time,
place, or manner of the speech but not the content itself. These
regulations are valid "provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information."'' 3 4 A discussion of the government interest and narrow
tailoring analysis under these tests follows.
2. The Government's Interest in Regulating Lobbying Activities
Courts have found that a number of government interests
support restrictions of lobbying activities. Laws that restrict lobbying
activities cannot be justified purely "under the guise of prohibiting
professional misconduct."' 35 However, given the effects of lobbying on
democratic governance, 36 courts have found that many lobbying
regulations can be justified by a compelling government interest. A
131. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
132. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
133. Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[O]verbreadth scrutiny has generally
been somewhat less rigid in the context of statutes regulating conduct in the shadow of the First
Amendment, but doing so in a neutral, noncensorial manner.").
134. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) The Court held
that "[T]he foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Park Service regulation is sustainable
under the ... standard of United States v. O'Brien, for validating a regulation of expressive
conduct, which, in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time,
place, or manner restrictions." Id. at 298 (internal citation omitted).
135. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (rejecting the argument that the state's
interest in regulating unethical conduct by attorneys was sufficiently compelling to justify a
Virginia statute prohibiting the improper solicitation of legal or professional business).
136. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 920-21 (1970)
(discussing the remedial nature of lobbying disclosure laws, given that they generate
"information of relevance to a democratic public" that leads courts to apply less stringent
analysis to them).
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district court examining New Jersey's lobbying disclosure law
described three compelling interests that justify administrative
requirements regulating lobbyists: (1) providing elected officials with
information regarding whose funds are being used to influence them
and discovering which of their constituencies is really advocating a
particular position; (2) allowing the public to more accurately assess
the performance of their lawmakers; and (3) promoting openness in
the lawmaking process.1 37  In Harriss, the Supreme Court also
asserted the government's interest in lobbying disclosure laws:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly
subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected
representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such
pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the
voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal....
Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures.... It [has]
acted... to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process.
1 3 8
Courts that have evaluated prohibitions on contingency fee
lobbying contracts have also found compelling state interests
supporting those laws. The tendency of such contracts to "promote the
temptation to use improper means to gain success" is a public policy
concern that is often cited as a compelling interest. 139  Since
contingency fee awards for lobbying often involve payment from
moneys awarded by the government, the government may also have
an interest in guarding government funds on behalf of taxpayers. 140
As the court in Hialeah Gardens stated, "For our citizens to support
our institutions of government, they must have confidence in the
integrity of public officials and in their actions, and among other
things, they have a right to expect good faith and honest dealings in
expenditure of the public treasury."' 41 In other contexts, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the government has a compelling interest in
137. ACLU of N.J. v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 509 F. Supp. 1123, 1129
(D.N.J. 1981).
138. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
139. Hialeah Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., 599 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992). In this case, the court refused to strike down a contingency fee contract because the
contingency was not, in fact, met, but it indicated that the arrangement is against public policy
and called the problem of contingency fee lobbying contracts to the attention of the state
legislature. Id. at 1325-26.
140. Id. at 1325 ("As between the innocent tax paying public and those who would gain from
contingent contracts with public entities or agencies, we come down on the side of the tax
payer.").
141. Id.
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preventing quid pro quo bribery in government and the appearance of
corruption that lowers public confidence. 142
3. Overbreadth
For both accidental and direct interferences with speech, a
court may use the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a statute when
it determines that the harm to society caused by the speech is
outweighed by the concern that the regulation will cause others to
refrain from engaging in protected expression. 143 Put another way, the
overbreadth doctrine applies to restrictions that are "susceptible of
sweeping and improper application." 144 Judges usually prefer to read
a statute narrowly and construe it consistently with the First
Amendment. 145 The Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma stated
that it is particularly reluctant to resort to an overbreadth analysis
when the challenged law regulates political activities in a neutral,
non-censorial way (in other words, when it is applying intermediate
scrutiny). 146 "[W]here conduct and not merely speech is involved, we
believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep."1 47 The Court is even more reluctant to strike down
time, place, and manner restrictions on overbreadth grounds, refusing
to require that the regulation is the least restrictive alternative to
achieve the government's desired end.1 48
142. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976). In Buckley, the Court found that the
actuality and appearance of corruption is a constitutionally sufficient justification for a $1,000
campaign contribution limit but not adequate to justify limits on independent expenditures, on
the ground that independent expenditures do not pose the same danger of corruption, since they
can occur with no coordination or prearrangement with the candidate's campaign. Id. at 26-27,
47.
143. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
144. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-35 (1963) (finding a Virginia state statute making
it a crime to advise an individual of his legal rights and refer him to a particular attorney or
group of attorneys to be overbroad because it "lends itself to selective enforcement against
unpopular causes").
145. Broadrick, 413 U.S., at 613 ("Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is,
manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last
resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could
be placed on the challenged statute.").
146. Id. at 614.
147. Id. at 615.
148. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the
time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the requirement of narrow
[Vol. 58:6:18851908
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Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down
regulations as overbroad, tailoring is relevant to the analysis of
contingency fee lobbying prohibitions. For example, the Montana
Supreme Court applied the overbreadth doctrine to strike down the
state's ban on contingency fee lobbying contracts, finding that the
prohibition covered agreements that were properly motivated as well
as those that were not.149 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
announced that statutes limiting 'the power of the people to initiate
legislation"' should be closely scrutinized, 150 and has struck down
regulations of fee arrangements in other contexts on the grounds that
they were not narrowly tailored. In 1988, the Supreme Court found
that a North Carolina law defining reasonable compensation for
individuals' fundraising for charities was not narrowly tailored to
meet the government's interest in preventing fraud.1 51 This was true
even though the law allowed the fundraiser to rebut the presumption
that fees beyond those set out in the statute were unreasonable. 15 2
Thus far, however, courts have still been reluctant to find
lobbying regulations, as well as regulations that may restrain other
political speech such as campaign contributions, to be overbroad given
the "remedial effect" of such laws.1 53 In Harriss, where the Supreme
Court upheld lobbying registration and disclosure laws, the Court
dismissed the idea that the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act's
potential to deter some individuals from engaging in lobbying
activities was enough to invalidate the statute.154 Almost thirty years
tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."
Id. (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)) (internal citation omitted)).
149. Mont. Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont. 1981); see also Associated Indus.
of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 958 (Ky. 1995) (Stephens, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The criminalization of lobbying on a contingent fee basis defies reason...
[T]he legislature infers that a contingency fee system automatically implies unethical
behavior."). But see Fla. League of Profl Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (lith Cir.
1996) (acknowledging the Montana Automobile decision and Supreme Court decisions discussing
current First Amendment doctrine that follow a different line of reasoning than that in the early
cases finding contingency fee lobbying contracts against public policy, but refusing to depart from
that earlier precedent).
150. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423 (1988) (quoting Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760,
763 (Colo. 1983)).
150. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988).
152. Id. at 792-93.
153. Note, supra note 136, at 920.
154. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
[H]ere Congress has used [the] power [of self-protection] in a manner restricted to its
appropriate end....
... Hypothetical borderline situations are conjured up in which such persons choose to
remain silent because of fear of possible prosecution for failure to comply with the Act.
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later, a district court refused to find overbroad a New York law that
the plaintiffs claimed was even more expansive than the federal law in
Harriss.155
4. The Idea of Money as Speech
One area of First Amendment law that courts and scholars
neglect concerns the notion that the regulation of money may
impermissibly affect free speech. 15 6 Given that a ban on contingency
fee lobbying contracts would regulate the fee arrangement, which is
non-speech conduct that would indirectly affect the resulting speech,
case law discussing the idea of money as speech is particularly
instructive. The First Amendment generally prevents the government
from requiring individuals to fund speech that they find
objectionable. 15 7 The government is not required to fund protected
speech activities; however, it may do so when it chooses 158 in which
case, it is not required to fund all such activities equally. 159 For
example, the Supreme Court has held that Congress is not required to
fund lobbying activities. 160 However, whether the government may
prohibit private individuals from spending money in a particular way,
Our narrow construction of the Act, precluding as it does reasonable fears, is
calculated to avoid such restraint .... The hazard of such restraint is too remote to
require striking down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area
of congressional power and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest.
Id.
155. Comm'n on Indep. Colls. and Univs. v. N.Y. Temp. State Comm'n on Regulation of
Lobbying, 534 F. Supp. 489, 497 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). But see, ACLU of N.J. v. N.J. Election Law
Enforcement Comm'n, 509 F. Supp. 1123, 1132-33 (D.N.J. 1981) (striking down the provision
requiring reporting and disclosure by groups engaged in activities not directed at the legislature
as overbroad, but upholding the remainder of the disclosure and reporting provision).
156. For an analysis of contingency fee lobbying contracts and the First Amendment that
does not treat in detail many of the cases discussed in this Section, such as the campaign finance
jurisprudence, see generally Fatka & Levien, supra note 90.
157. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 405 (2001).
158. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (finding that the public financing
scheme created under the Federal Election Campaign Act could be sustained under the First
Amendment, and that it enhanced public discussion rather than restricting or censoring speech).
159. See, e.g., Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1991)
(finding that summary judgment for the defendants was inappropriate because factual issues
existed regarding whether a parade permit ordinance was being applied in a discriminatory
fashion, and remanding the case to the district court to resolve issues of unconstitutional
enforcement).
160. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (citing
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (superseded by statute, current version at
26 U.S.C. § 162(e) (2005))) (finding that a prohibition on substantial lobbying activities for
organizations with tax-exempt status is not a violation of the First Amendment, even though
Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying generally but created an exception for veterans'
organizations).
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such as with a ban on contingency fee lobbying contracts, is a more
complicated question. Although money is not always equivalent to
speech, 161 there are some situations when courts will find that
regulations dealing with money impermissibly curtail First
Amendment freedoms.
One relevant line of cases deals with campaign finance
regulations, since both campaign finance laws and contingency fee
lobbying prohibitions regulate funds in the political arena. In Buckley
v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld campaign contribution limits but
struck down campaign expenditure limits. 162 The Court announced
that the dependence of speech on the expenditure of money does not
necessarily introduce a non-speech element to justify lowering the
level of scrutiny required. 163 The Court also recognized that almost
every means of communication in society now requires some
expenditure of money.1 64 According to the Court, limits on campaign
expenditures in the Federal Election Campaign Act created a
substantial restriction on political speech. 65  The Court then
contrasted the direct restraint on speech involved in restricting
expenditures with the indirect restriction imposed by the Act's limits
on campaign contributions. 66  The restraint on campaign
contributions was sustained since contributions only result in
expression when spent by the candidate, and they can still serve as
evidence of the symbolic expression of support for a candidate
regardless of their size. 67
161. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262-63 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
argument that money is speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the
First Amendment proves entirely too much.").
162. Id. at 143 (majority opinion).
163. Id. at 16. The Court went on to state that even if it accepted the argument that the
expenditure of money was conduct rather than pure speech, the expenditure limits in FECA
would not pass muster under the applicable O'Brien analysis. Id. at 17.
164. Id. at 19.
165. Id. (stating that "a restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached").
166. Id. at 20-21 (characterizing limits on contributions as a "marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication").
167. Id. at 21. The opinion also noted that the contribution caps might be more suspect if
there was evidence that they prevented candidates from acquiring sufficient resources to
communicate their message, rather than simply requiring them to seek funding from more
sources. Id. at 24-29. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger disagreed with any distinction between
the communication involved in political contributions and the communication involved in
political expenditures, saying that the constitutional interest in communicating a political
interest is no different whether an individual spends money to speak himself or funds another
person's speech. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The Court also found that the government could make behavior
other than bribery unlawful in the interest of preventing corruption:
But laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action...
Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure,
and that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the
reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial
contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their
contributions are fully disclosed.
1 6 8
The opinion in Buckley noted that the government may not, consistent
with the First Amendment, "determine that spending to promote one's
political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. ''169
The Court also considered overbreadth arguments in Buckley.
Appellants argued that campaign contribution ceilings are overbroad
because they restrict contributions even when there is no proven or
suspected improper influence involved and because the ceiling amount
does not take into account the differences in resources required for
campaigns at different levels of government. 170 Although the Court
acknowledged that bribery and disclosure laws could address some of
the clearest abuses, it found that Congress had the power to regulate
more stringently through contribution limits because of its interest in
eliminating the appearance of corruption and the difficulty of isolating
suspect contributions individually. 71 Therefore, the Court refused to
determine whether the chosen ceiling was appropriate. 172
Recently, the Court revisited the idea of money as speech in the
campaign finance context in McConnell v. FEC, which assessed the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA").' 73
Citing the compelling interest in preventing the actuality and
appearance of corruption, the Court upheld the part of the BCRA that
limited the amount of "soft money" donations that individuals can
make to political parties174 and the manner in which the parties can
168. Id. at 27-28.
169. Id. at 57.
170. Id. at 29-30.
171. Id. at 30.
172. Id.; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395-96 (2000) (finding that
contribution limits lower than those in Buckley under Missouri state law were not significantly
different from those in Buckley and did not require a different analysis as to whether they were
appropriately tailored to serve the government's interest in preventing actual or perceived
corruption).
173. 540 U.S. 93, 132-33 (2003).
174. Id. at 143-52. "Soft money" is considered money donated to political parties, not
earmarked for a particular candidate or race, used for advocacy advertising, generic party
advertising, and "get out the vote" efforts. Prior to the BCRA, soft money contributions often
vastly exceeded the legal limit for "hard money" donations under FECA. Id. at 122-26.
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solicit donations. 175 The Court found this interest compelling in light
of evidence that soft money donors are motivated more by attempts to
influence legislators than by political ideology. 176 Restrictions on soft
money donations to state and local party committees are also
permissible under McConnell because of the government's interest in
preventing corruption from spreading to the states.1 77 However, the
Court struck down a provision stating that a party wishing to spend
more than $5,000 in coordination with a nominee may not use
independent expenditures to support advocacy that directly supports a
candidate. 78 According to the Court, even though this provision only
burdened a small class of speech, this speech was nonetheless
protected and the provision could not be justified by a government
interest in preventing parties from engaging in such direct
advocacy.179
In McConnell, the Court rejected a number of arguments that
provisions of the BCRA are overbroad. One such argument was that a
restriction on "soft money" donations to political parties was
impermissibly overbroad because it applied not just to funds spent by
parties on federal elections, but also to funds spent on state and local
elections. 80 Since the national parties are so closely aligned with the
federal officeholders who control them, the Court found that the only
way to effectively address the appearance of corruption from soft
money at the national level is to prevent such donations to national
parties, regardless of how the money is ultimately spent.' 8 ' Similar
reasoning led the Court to conclude that a prohibition on soliciting soft
money donations was not overbroad.182  The Court found that
provisions limiting donations to state parties were also not overbroad
because they were narrowly focused on only the contributions posing
the greatest risk of direct influence on federal officeholders.
Contributions that can be used to directly influence federal candidates
175. Id. at 157-58.
176. Id. at 146-47. The Court cites the fact that over half of the top soft money donors in the
1996 and 2000 elections donated to both major parties. Id. at 148.
177. Id. at 165-66.
178. Id. at 216-19 (finding that there was not a "meaningful government interest" sufficient
to justify the provision).
179. Id. at 217-18 ("Any claim that a restriction on independent express advocacy serves a
strong Government interest is belied by the overwhelming evidence that the line between
express advocacy and other types of election-influencing expression is, for Congress' purposes,
functionally meaningless.").
180. Id. at 154.
181. Id. at 155-56.
182. Id. at 157-58.
2005] 1913
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
were regulated,18 3 while contributions used for activity not related to a
federal election were excluded from regulation. 184 Under McConnell,
Congress could also prevent corporations and unions from funding
electioneering communications, including issue advertising (as
opposed to advertising that expressly advocates the election of a
candidate), out of their general treasuries without raising overbreadth
concerns.
18 5
A number of cases outside the campaign finance context also
address the issue of money as speech. When the government
financially burdens speech in any way, whether through imposing a
cost such as a fee or tax or prohibiting a private payment, the court
will use the O'Brien balancing test to ask whether there is a
substantial government interest, whether in furthering that interest
the regulation unnecessarily burdens speech, and whether the burden
is imposed in a way that is content-neutral. A statute is considered
content-neutral if its purpose is unrelated to the content of the speech
and it only incidentally burdens some speakers.18 6 For example, in
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court stuck
down an ordinance that allowed variations in permit fees for
assemblies and parades based on the anticipated costs of those
gatherings.18 7  The Court reasoned that since those costs were
associated with public reaction to the speech, the burden was not
content-neutral.188
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board, the Court struck down New York's "Son of Sam"
law, which required persons accused or convicted of a crime to donate
all money received from works describing the crime to the Crime
Victims Board which would hold the money in an escrow account for
five years to satisfy potential civil judgments won by victims.' 8 9 The
Court found that the statute singled out "income derived from
expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income,
and it is directed only at works with a specified content."1 90 Whether
the criminal himself or the publisher was the speaker was irrelevant
because the statute only created a disincentive to create or publish one
183. Id. at 166-69.
184. Id. at 181.
185. Id. at 207-08.
186. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
122 (1991).
188. 505 U.S. 123, 132-33 (1992).
188. Id. at 134.
189. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108.
190. Id. at 116.
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type of work, that describing a crime. 191 The Court announced that
sometimes differential treatment based on content may be justified
where there is a compelling government interest and the statute is
narrowly drawn.192 While the Court considered the interest in
compensating victims of crime to be compelling, the statute was not
narrowly tailored because it included works on any subject so long as
they included some material describing the crime and because it
defined persons convicted of a crime to include persons who admit to a
crime even if they were never formally accused or convicted.193
The Supreme Court also struck down a prohibition on a fee
arrangement between private parties in Meyer v. Grant.1 94 This case
involved a Colorado statute that made it unlawful for an individual to
receive payment for organizing a petition in support of a ballot
initiative. 195 The Court found that provisions such as those making it
a crime to forge a signature on a petition or to pay someone to sign a
petition were sufficient to meet the government's asserted interest in
maintaining the integrity of the initiative procedures. 96 The Court
stated, "Colorado's prohibition of paid petition circulators restricts
access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical
avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one communication."'1 97
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Why First Amendment Concerns Are Implicated
One way to avoid potential constitutional problems associated
with a ban on contingency fee lobbying contracts is to argue that the
fee arrangement and the speech involved are entirely distinct and the
First Amendment is not implicated at all. This argument, however, is
likely to fail. First Amendment concerns are still relevant in many
191. Id.
192. Id. at 118.
193. Id. at 120-23. In concurring, Justice Kennedy stated his belief that the fact that the
regulation was not content-neutral was itself a reason to strike down the statute, and that the
Court's analysis of compelling government interest and overinclusiveness was inappropriately
drawn from equal protection jurisprudence. Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
195. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 (1988) (finding that the prohibition could not be
justified either by an interest in ensuring that a measure has enough grassroots support to make
it onto the ballot or by an interest in ensuring the integrity of the initiative process).
195. Id. at 417.
196. Id. at 427-28.
197. Id. at 424.
2005] 1915
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
cases where non-speech conduct is regulated 198 and hiring a lobbyist
certainly has something to do with speech (even if the fee
arrangement does not) since it involves hiring someone to speak on
another's behalf. It is clear from both the line of cases upholding
regulation of lobbying 99 and cases striking down prohibitions on fees
paid to those engaged in other types of expression 200 that a federal
prohibition on contingency lobbying contracts at least raises some
First Amendment concerns.
Alternatively, one might argue that any First Amendment
concerns are without merit because a prohibition of contingency fee
lobbying contracts would still leave clients free to hire lobbyists, who
would be free to speak and petition the government on behalf of their
clients. While this argument was offered with some success in cases
evaluating the constitutionality of lobbying disclosure laws,201
disclosure laws likely have less of a deterrent effect than a ban on
contingency fee lobbying, which actually prohibits a certain lobbying
activity entirely. 20 2 Since a ban on contingency fee lobbying places a
financial burden on speech which may create a disincentive to hire a
lobbyist and petition the government, 203 First Amendment analysis is
198. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that a law
prohibiting the mutilation of Selective Service cards does not, on its face, abridge free speech, but
where speech and non-speech elements combine in a single course of conduct, a significant
government interest must outweigh the incidental burdens on speech).
199. Lobbying disclosure laws traditionally are not subject to the more exacting level of
scrutiny applied to laws that infringe upon "pure speech." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 625-26 (1954); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 717-18 (4th Cir. 1999);
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Comm'n on Indep. Colls. &
Univs. v. N.Y. Temp. State Comm'n on Regulation of Lobbying, 534 F. Supp. 489, 501-04
(N.D.N.Y. 1982); Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228, 231-32 (D. Conn. 1973); United States v.
Slaughter, 89 F. Supp. 205, 206 (D.D.C. 1950); Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912
S.W.2d 947, 952-54 (Ky. 1995); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 47-51 (Vt. 1995); Fritz v. Gorton,
517 P.2d 911, 929 (Wash. 1974).
200. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
123 (1991); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428; Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 793,
800-02 (1988).
201. See, e.g., Slaughter, 89 F. Supp. at 206 (finding that lobbying registration and disclosure
provisions leaves lobbyists free to exercise their right to speak, asking only that they disclose
how much they are paid to speak and for whom they are speaking).
202. The dissenting opinions in Harriss indicate how lobbying regulations may deter speech.
347 U.S. at 628, 633. Justice Douglas thought that registration requirements could cause "all
who might possibly be covered to act at their peril," meaning that the law "would in practical
effect be a deterrent to the exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. at 632 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson argued that "we may not forget that our constitutional system is to
allow the greatest freedom of access to Congress, so that the people may press for their selfish
interests, with Congress acting as the arbiter of their demands and conflicts." Id. at 635
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
203. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116-17 (rejecting the argument that New York's
"Son of Sam" law is distinguishable from a law taxing a percentage of income earned from speech
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still necessary. Since courts apply the First Amendment more or less
strictly depending on the nature of the regulation, it is important to
determine where a contingency lobbying prohibition falls on the
spectrum of this analysis.
B. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
It is unlikely that the highest level of scrutiny would apply to a
ban on contingency fee lobbying since the purpose of the ban would
not be to suppress speech, but to target corruption and prevent misuse
of public funds. Furthermore, current proposals do not discriminate in
any way based on the content of the message the lobbyist seeks to
convey. 204 Consequently, Simon & Schuster should not apply because
in that case, the Court focused on the fact that the "Son of Sam" law
escrowed payments made for works with particular content. 20 5 One
might argue that banning contingency fee lobbying contracts does
burden speech of a particular content, as it is most likely to restrain
only speech related to legislation that could result in an award of
government funds. However, on its face a prohibition on contingency
fee lobbying does not examine the message that the lobbyists are
delivering; it only considers how that message was financed. The
prohibition applies equally to those hiring a contingency fee lobbyist in
pursuit of government funding and those who hire a lobbyist on a
contingent basis to push legislation that would provide no monetary
benefits at all. Therefore, a ban on contingency fee lobbying is
distinguishable from the "Son of Sam" law in Simon & Schuster and
would seemingly be exempt from the more exacting scrutiny applied to
content-based regulations. The intermediate level of scrutiny applied
in many cases involving the right to petition and freedom of speech, 206
which requires that Congress be able to assert a substantial
activities, saying this reason "can hardly serve as the basis for disparate treatment under the
First Amendment. Both forms of financial burden operate as disincentives to speak ... ").
204. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (refusing to find that contribution
limitations discriminated against non-incumbent candidates and thus were invalid on their face
on the ground that "the Act applies the same limitations on contributions to all candidates
regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations").
205. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116.
206. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Framers viewed First Amendment rights as interrelated components of the people's
right to exercise their authority); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 n.l (1985) (holding
that the right to petition and freedom of speech are typically subject to the same analysis);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (holding that First Amendment rights are
inseparable).
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government interest and tailor the statute to serve that interest, 2 7 is
thus the more appropriate mode of analysis.
1. Would a Ban on Contingency Fee Lobbying be Supported by
Substantial Government Interests?
Although Congress could not justify a ban on contingency fee
lobbying contracts merely as a restriction on misconduct in the
lobbying profession, 208 a number of possible interests have been
deemed compelling under strict scrutiny in other contexts and thus
would also be substantial under intermediate scrutiny. Given that
lobbying is related to political and lawmaking processes, the Court's
decisions in the campaign finance and lobbying disclosure contexts are
probably indicative of how the present Court would view the interests
served by a ban on contingency fee lobbying. In Buckley, one of the
asserted interests in limiting campaign contributions was preventing
the influence that contributors hope their money will wield over
government officials. 209 Similarly, contingency fee lobbying implicates
the possibility of inappropriate influence. 210 The Supreme Court has
also found that while Congress has a compelling interest in preventing
actual corruption, it may also legislate to prevent any appearance of
corruption which lowers public confidence in government.211 "To say
that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to
safeguard.., an election from the improper use of money to influence
207. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (saying that the Court has
long required that statutes burdening free speech must be narrowly drawn and justified by a
compelling interest). But see Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 124-25 (Kennedy J., concurring)
(arguing that the compelling interest and narrow tailoring requirements applied in First
Amendment cases, which are in fact borrowed from equal protection doctrine, may not be
appropriate in cases involving content-based restrictions on speech). Justice Kennedy's argument
that this analysis should be disposed of could be interesting should one challenge the
contingency fee lobbying prohibition as content-based. However, as will be argued infra, such a
prohibition is not likely to be content-based, and either way it is clear that the requirements of
compelling government interest and narrow tailoring are well entrenched in First Amendment
doctrine.
208. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (rejecting argument that the interest in
regulating unethical conduct by attorneys was sufficiently compelling to justify a Virginia
statute prohibiting the improper solicitation of legal or professional business).
209. 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) ('To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.").
210. See Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71, 79 (1906) (finding that a contingency fee lobbying
contract tends to invite the possibility of improper solicitation from the moment of its inception
and must be struck down regardless of the intention underlying the agreement).
211. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of
the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.").
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the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of
self- protection."212
This rationale translates easily from the election context to the
lawmaking context.213 Congress may be able to justify a ban on
contingency fee lobbying contracts on the grounds of ensuring both the
actuality and appearance of integrity in the legislative process, 214
which is at least as fundamental to the democratic process as the
election process protected by campaign finance provisions. Public
perceptions of corruption plague lobbying in general, 21 5 so this interest
may be validly asserted here. Cases discussing the regulation of
lobbying also indicate that there are compelling interests at stake.
Over fifty years ago in Harriss, the Court had already recognized the
increasing ability of special interest lobbying to taint the legislative
process and the difficulty of recognizing and evaluating the many
pressures facing legislators absent legal restraints on lobbying.216
Though the interests advanced by a contingency fee lobbying
ban may be compelling, one concern is that they could be addressed in
other ways, such as passing and enforcing laws prohibiting bribery or
corruption. In Buckley, however, the Court addressed this concern in
the campaign finance context, finding that Congress was entitled to
impose contribution limits despite the fact that anti-bribery laws and
disclosure laws also target similar evils. 217 Thus, Congress can assert
that while lobbying disclosure rules encourage openness in the
legislative process, these laws are not sufficient to deter lobbyists from
working on a contingency fee basis and retaining some of the
212. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
213. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988) (noting that the Court in Buckley equated
First Amendment principles involved in expression dealing with the election or defeat of a
candidate in an election with those involved in expression dealing with discussion of public policy
or the advocacy of passage of legislation).
214. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972) (recognizing the importance of
maintaining integrity in the legislative process, as this was part of the rationale for the inclusion
of the Speech and Debate Clause in the Constitution).
215. See supra Part I.
216. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly
subjected. Yet full realization of the American idea of government by elected
representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such
pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all to easily be drowned out by the
voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal.
Id.
217. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (holding that Congress could determine that
contribution ceilings were necessary to eliminate the actuality and appearance of corruption
because bribery laws deal only with the most blatant attempts to influence lawmakers, and it
could rationally decide that requiring disclosure of contributions was only a partial measure).
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government funds received by their clients. That the Court has gone
further recently in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and
upheld more sweeping campaign finance regulations suggests that the
Court is willing to give Congress leeway to stop the improper influence
of money in politics. 218
Yet another rationale for a prohibition on contingency fee
lobbying is the fact that moneys paid on contingency fee lobbying
contracts often come out of money awarded to the lobbyist's client
from funds awarded by the government. 219 It is thus the taxpayers
who ultimately pay these lobbyists.220 Therefore, it can be argued that
there is a substantial interest in protecting public funds.
Since the government can likely demonstrate substantial
interests for this legislation, it is necessary that the legislation
actually advance those interests. Perhaps the greatest obstacle in this
regard is Meyer v. Grant, where the Court held that a state law
prohibiting payment to individuals organizing petitions for ballot
initiatives did not meet the state's interests in ensuring that the
organizers actually had sufficient support to get on the ballot and in
maintaining the integrity of the initiative process. 221  A ban on
contingency fee lobbying contracts, however, may be distinguished
from a ban on paid petition circulators. While the state law in Meyer
prohibited petition circulators from being paid at all,222 a ban on
contingency fee lobbying contracts still permits lobbyists to be paid
and in no way limits the amount of compensation. In Meyer, the Court
also focused on the reduction of total speech on a public issue that
would result from prohibiting payment for petition circulators,
because relying only on volunteers would reduce the number of
persons advocating the message and reaching the public. 223 This
concern is not as great in the lobbying context, since the audience for
an initiative petition may be large and consist of the general public,
but the audience for lobbying activities is limited to lawmakers.
Where issues offered up as initiatives easily implicate the public
interest, issues handled by lobbyists more often implicate special
218. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 144-45 (2003).
219. See supra note 80 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
220. Doris, supra note 10.
221. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-28 (1988) (finding that the state's interest in
ensuring that a measure has grassroots support is met by laws requiring that a measure cannot
be placed on the ballot without a minimum number of signatures, and that its interest in
ensuring the integrity of the initiative process could be met with laws making it unlawful to force
a signature on a petition, to place false statements on a petition, and to pay someone to sign a
petition).
222. Id. at 416.
223. Id. at 422-23.
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interests. 224 Finally, while payments for petition circulators would be
made out of entirely private funds, contingency fees for lobbying often
come out of public funds, adding a compelling interest for this
legislation that was not present in Meyer.
2. Would a Ban on Contingency Fee Lobbying be Overbroad?
Since a federal prohibition on contingency fee lobbying is
supported by a number of substantial interests and would be designed
to further these interests, the only problem that such a prohibition
may still face is an overbreadth challenge. A prohibition on these
contracts, as currently proposed, would reach not just arrangements
that led to the use of improper influence and those that involve
payment of government funds, but all contingency fee arrangements of
any kind in lobbying.225 A century ago, the Supreme Court specifically
rejected the idea that it should accept as a defense the fact that
improper means were not actually contemplated or used to influence
lawmakers. 226
If eliminating the appearance of corruption is asserted as an
interest supporting the ban, this interest would be furthered by
striking down all contingency fee contracts without asking what
means were actually employed by the lobbyist. Based on this interest
and the Court's general reluctance to strike down regulations as
overbroad, particularly when it is applying intermediate scrutiny, it is
unlikely that a federal prohibition on contingency fee lobbying
contracts is unconstitutional. Congress may conclude that prohibiting
all contingency fee lobbying contracts is the only way to eliminate the
appearance of corruption that the Supreme Court has found inevitably
attaches to these contracts. 227 Furthermore, in Buckley the Court
responded to overbreadth challenges to contribution limits by
recognizing the difficulty of isolating suspect contributions
individually. 228  It would be similarly difficult for prosecutors to
224. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Skelly, J.,
concurring) (observing that lobbyists often represent special interests, which may be directly at
odds with the public interest).
225. See Associated Indus. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 947, 958 (Ky. 1995)
(Stephens, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting implication that contingency
fees necessarily imply unethical behavior); Mont. Auto. Ass'n v. Greely, 632 P.2d 300, 308 (Mont.
1981) (striking down a contingency fee lobbying ban on the grounds that it covered both properly
and improperly motivated agreements).
226. Hazelton v. Sheckels, 202 U.S. 71, 79 (1906).
228. Providence Tool. Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 55 (1864) (stating that "the introduction of
improper elements" are the "direct and inevitable result" of all contingency fee lobbying
contracts).
228. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976).
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separate the suspect contingency fee contracts from the permissible
ones.
Some scholars characterize political money as a "moving
target,"229 noting that those desiring political power or influence over
the political process will often react to constraints on spending by
simply spending elsewhere or in different ways.230 If the law did not
cover all contracts, lobbyists hoping to avoid prosecution would
inevitably resort to more subtle practices, and clients would structure
their financial transactions to avoid the appearance that moneys were
being paid out of public funds. Given the Court's recognition in
McConnell that broad regulations are necessary in the field of
campaign finance to combat this kind of avoidance, 231 the Court would
likely find that a blanket prohibition on contingency fee lobbying was
properly tailored to target this activity. Some have cited overbreadth
concerns as a reason that Congress should abandon this legislation
entirely, and even believe that the courts should revisit this issue and
grant constitutional protection to contingency fee lobbying. 232
However, as the discussion above demonstrates, there is sufficient
evidence that a ban on contingency fee lobbying contracts would not be
found unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
In a time when the public's faith in the political process is at an
all-time low, and billions of dollars are spent every year both on
electing and influencing lawmakers, it is essential that Congress have
the power to regulate corrupt practices. A prohibition on contingency
fee lobbying contracts for lobbying Congress is long overdue, as
evidenced by measures adopted to prohibit such contracts when
targeted towards other branches of the federal government and by
229. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707 (1999).
230. Id. at 1705.
It doesn't take an Einstein to discern a First Law of Political Thermodynamics-the
desire for political power cannot be destroyed, but at most, channeled into different
forms-nor a Newton to identify a Third Law of Political Motion-every reform effort
to constrain political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with
power to hold onto it.
Id.
231. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 165-66 (2003) (discussing how
regulations covering the state level were necessary to prevent corruption from merely shifting
from national to state parties).
232. Fatka & Levien, supra note 90, at 587 (concluding that Congress should not enact a
prohibition on contingency fee lobbying contracts and that the Supreme Court should revisit the
issue and explicitly grant constitutional protection to contingency fee lobbying arrangements).
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numerous state laws banning the practice. This largely unseen
practice will only expand as the number of lobbyists in Washington
grows and the money spent on these lobbyists continues to increase.
The Supreme Court's opinions in the realm of campaign finance
indicate that it is willing to give Congress a great deal of leeway in
regulating corrupt practices in politics. A ban on contingency fee
lobbying is the only effective way to ensure that lobbyists will not be
tempted to resort to corrupt behaviors by such fees, to protect public
funds, and to eliminate the appearance of corruption with respect to
this practice. Congress should pass this measure to ensure that
lobbyists can no longer "gouge the government"233 to achieve personal
gain.
Meredith A. Capps*
233. See supra note 80 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) and accompanying text.
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